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Abstract— This research paper is a study on the TOR Foun-
dation and the TOR Network. Due to the blind confidence over
this network and this foundation we have collected data and
gathered open source information to analyze and to understand
how this foundation is organized. We have discovered that
the US government is very active through the financial and
development aspect. Furthermore, we have discovered that a
few critical points about this network, especially that it is
managed by unknown people who run and manage special
nodes, a fact the foundation never talks about.
I. INTRODUCTION
The TOR Project (http://www.torproject.org) is the most
famous project about privacy and anonymity online. Simply,
it is another network where everybody has only the knowl-
edge of his direct neighbor. From this very simple principle,
the TOR network routes packets through at least three nodes
that ensure that the sender does not know the receiver and
conversely. In this network, you can access hidden services
which are web service. These services are not indexed by
classical search engines. These services are used by several
kinds of people and some of them are using the TOR network
(and the services provided) because it is their only way to
communicate in a safe and anonymous way.
In a country where there is a lot of censorship, jour-
nalists can use the TOR network in order to bypass it. In
the official website of the TOR project, it is claimed that
the TOR network is also used by the military to “protect
their communications”. From those perspectives, over the
years people have developed a big confidence in the TOR
network and in the foundation which controls and manages
it. Officially. Allegedly, this foundation claims to have no
link with US government (any other one) and is independent
(Dingledine, 2017). There is a growing feeling that this
may not be the case. Recurrent questions arise that put
this apparent independence into question: what if the US
government was behind the TOR network and if somehow
controls it? The recent dismantling of Silk road 2.0 by the
FBI (Leinwand Leger, 2014) is still not explained from
a technical point of view and growing suspicions suggest
that a partial control at least by the US government over
the foundation cannot be discarded. Hence, if true, the
protection of the communication will no longer be true and
the confidence in this network should not be warranted. In
fact, the TOR project is an implementation of a concept born
in the US Naval Research Laboratory (Goldschlag et al.,
1996; Syverson et al., 1997). Paul Syverson is the designer of
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the routing protocol and was part of the original development
team of the TOR network. Hence the TOR infancy was
clearly linked with the US government and still is.
In this paper, we present the results of a deep OSINT and
technical analysis of the TOR network and the Tor foundation
which tends to prove that their alleged independence is far
from being so clear and acceptable. The paper is organized as
follows. We first explain and analyze in the second section
what are the TOR directory authorities, what their role is
and how they are managed. In the third section, we explore
and expose the internal organization of the TOR foundation
and which projects are related to it. In the fourth section
we present the results of our deep financial analysis of the
TOR foundation funding. It clearly shows that the alleged
independence is actually not true. Finally, before concluding
we present in the fifth section a few technical aspects that
strongly mitigate the claim that the TOR foundation manage-
ment is suitable for a maximal security and anonymity of the
TOR network. All resources presented in the present paper
(high definition graphs especially) as well as many others
are available on the Blog laboratory (Filiol et al. 2017).
II. DIRECTORY AUTHORITY
A. What is the goal of this node ?
In this part, we will talk about the directory authorities (see
https://svn.torproject.org/svn/tor/tags/
tor-0_2_1_4_alpha/doc/spec/dir-spec.txt
for details). The purpose of these specific nodes is to handle
the complete network to maintain a list of “currently-
running” nodes (this list is refreshed every thirty minutes,
so it is not really “currently-running”). All those running
nodes are stored in a public file named “consensus”. This
file is distributed in order to tell all nodes what is the state
of the network, which nodes are running or not.
Every thirty minutes, any node on the TOR network needs
to register itself at one or more directory authorities. If a
node becomes down or has an issue, it will not be able to
register itself on a directory authority. Once each node has
been registered, the directory authority will vote to create a
new consensus file. The vote is the action of defining the
consensus weight of each node in function of the advertised
bandwidth, the real bandwidth and the date/time since the
node is registered. The consensus weight is one of the
most important information in the consensus file because it
will define the new bandwidth assigned to each node. As
we prove on other research paper (Filiol et al., 2018), the
bandwidth is the most important key parameter of the TOR
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network because we can target specific nodes to take the
control of a major part of the traffic. Those nodes (Filiol et
al., 2017) are the principal weakness of the TOR network
because they define the future state of the network. If we
shut down all those nodes, the TOR network will continue
to work but will be less and less efficient due to the changes
which cannot be specified to the other nodes without the
consensus file.
Currently, there are nine directory authorities, eight for all
the nodes and one especially for the bridges (called Bridge
Authority). Bridges are non-public nodes whose purpose is
mostly to enable censorship bypassing. Only the TOR foun-
dation does know the exact list. These directory authorities
(bridges authority included) are hard-written in the source
code with their IP address, their port and their fingerprint.
The concern is that we do not know who is responsible
and manages these nodes. No information is available on
the website of the TOR Project and the only information
available is in the Changelog file, but we only have derived
information about the node and not the true owner of the
node. The purpose of our study is to see the different changes
of directory authorities through versions and which is the
actual owner of each node. We intended to see the link
between owners of directory authority and the TOR Project
and how they can justify the possession of specific nodes.
B. Evolution of directory authorities through version
To do this part of our study, we download all versions of
the TOR Project since the beginning. The last version we
study is the version tor-0.3.0.3-alpha released on February
3rd, 2017. No changes were made between the last version
and the version tor-0.3.2.1-alpha. We have used the Maltego
Software to do a graph of directory authorities for each
version. The graph is given in Figure 1. The big nodes are
the directory authorities which were used for most of the
versions. With this classification, we will see which directory
authorities are the more relevant to study.
Fig. 1. Directory Authorities through TOR version
From the graph, we can explain major changes of Di-
rectory Authorities. The changes of IP addresses or ports
will not be detailed (except if it is the last changes and
the most important one). In total, 30 directory authorities
were present in different versions (changes of IP addresses
included) for 16 different names. In the graph, all biggest
points are directory authorities and the smaller ones are each
version in the TOR source code.
At the beginning, all directory authorities (three at the
time) were owned by the same person on the same IP
address but on different ports (Moria1, Moria2 and Moria3).
At this time, only Moria1 is still active. Since 2006, one
(still active) directory authority was released every two years
(except for 2008, we have two directory authorities). In order
of appearance, we have Dizum (tor-0.1.1.18, April 2006),
Gabelmoo (tor-0.2.0.16, January 2008), Dannenberg (tor-
0.2.0.18, January 2008), Maatuska (tor-0.2.2.14, July 2010),
Faravahar (tor-0.2.3.23, October 2012) and Longclaw (tor-
0.2.6.2, December 2014). In total, there is seven directory
authorities and Moria1 still active with the bridge authority.
The bridge authority has changed over time. At first, Tonga
appears in the version tor-0.2.0.6 in August 2007 to be
replaced by Bifroest in the version tor-0.2.9.2 in August
2016. Aside all of these directory authorities, five others
directory authorities came and left few versions after. Since
the last change (Tonga to Bifroest), no other changes were
made in the current version (tor-0.3.2.1, September 2017).
Now, let us focus on the nine directory authorities which
are present in the last version. Table 1 summarizes how the
different versions of the TOR network are using all those
directory authorities.
Number of versions % (456 in total)
Moria 1 435 95%
Dizum 270 59%
Gabelmoo 226 49%
Dannenberg 223 49%
Maatuska 166 36%
Faravahar 110 24%
Longclaw 74 16%
Bifroest 47 10%
TABLE I
NUMBER OF VERSION USING THOSE DIRECTORY AUTHORITIES
As we can see, a few of the directory authorities are very
recent. Taling into account the fact that the versions of TOR
are released at least three per three (multiple versions are
changed in the same time), the array proves that the TOR
Project puts a high confidence in their owner. However, up to
us, the user does not have any information about the owner
of those very important nodes. A study of each user, their
connection with the TOR Project is necessary to evaluate the
actual confidence users can give.
C. Owners of directory authorities
For every owner of directory authorities, we have made an
OSINT study on this people to see what are their connections
with the TOR Project and if one can actually trust these
people. In addition, we have conducted a study on the nodes
themselves including geolocation and different information
on those nodes. We consider as a “confident people” the
person that has a visible connection to the TOR Project
(through their “Core People” pages, through projects around
TOR etc. . . ). We will also study the directory authority one
by one, starting with the most used.
For Moria1, the current IP address is 128.31.0.39. Since
the first version, this node is on one of the two MIT networks
(128.31.0.0/16 or 18.238.0.0/17). This node is geolocated in
Cambridge (Massachusetts – United States). The owner is
Roger Dingledine, one of the three creators of the TOR
Project (and a former NSA employee). At the time of
the study, ten “classic” nodes were registered in the MIT
network. We were able to gather those nodes either with
their IP address or with their hostname (ending by mit.edu).
The second most important node is Dizum. This directory
authority has never changed (IP address 194.109.206.212).
The geolocation points towards the Netherlands, near Dor-
drecht. His owner is Alex De Joode and we were not able to
find any link between Alex De Joode and the TOR Project.
Is it annoying when we see that his directory authority is the
most important one. In fact, a full blind confidence to this
person is given while it is not possible to link him to the
TOR Project in a way or another.
The third is Gabelmoo on the IP address 131.188.40.189
(on the network 131.188.0.0/16). This directory authority
is the most mobile of all, with five changes during almost
ten years. For the last IP address, the geolocation indicates
Erlangen in Germany. This directory authority is set up on a
university network. In this network, three “classic” nodes are
registered. The owner is Sebastian Hanh who is a developer
on the TOR Network. Another node belongs to Sebastian
Hanh but on a different network (IP address 78.47.18.110).
The fourth is Dannenberg (193.23.244.244) and has
changed once. This modification does not change the ge-
olocation of this node, which is still in Berlin. This node is
hosted in the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) and handled by
Andreas Lehner. He is registered on the Core People page.
For Maatuska (171.25.193.9), only one change of IP
address was made (old IP address: 213.115.239.118). This
directory authority is apparently located in Stockholm in
Sweden (RIPE Database). In the range 171.25.193.0/24,
eight “classic” nodes are set up. Those nodes are handled
by Linus Goldberg who is a confirmed member of the TOR
Project.
Faravahar (154.35.175.225) has changed only once (pre-
vious IP address 154.35.32.5). Sina Rabbani is the handler of
this directory authority. He works with the TOR Project and
is present on the Core People page. The node is located in
the USA (Washigton DC according to the ARIN Database).
No other “classic” nodes are on the same network.
The last directory authority (excluding the bridge author-
ity) is Longclaw (199.254.238.52). It has been set up in 2014
and this node is too recent to have previous changes. The
owner of this directory authority and three “classic” nodes
(on the network 199.254.238.0/24) is the foundation Riseup
Network. The geolocation is not very precise: this node
is indicated as located in Missouri, USA. With our study,
we can affirm that Micah Anderson is behind the RiseUp
Network and is the real owner of this directory authority. He
has recently disappeared from the Core People page.
The last one and the most important node authority is
the bridge authority Bifroest (37.218.247.217). Bifroest is not
the first bridge authority. Tonga was in place before leaving
the place to Bifroest. This bridge authority is in place in
Amsterdam (Netherlands). The person known as Isis Agora
Lovecruft is responsible of the bridge authority. However,
this is not the person who is registered in the RIPE Database
but two members of the GreenHost firm instead.
To conclude, we see that seven people over the nine have
a visible relation to the TOR Project. This means, we have
let the control of the TOR network to two unknown people
(Micah Anderson and Alex De Joode). Alex De Joode is
the oldest directory authority which different from those
belonging to Roger Dingledine. From the beginning, he has
helped running the TOR network but we do not have any
information about this person. It is the same situation for
Micah Anderson who is hidden behind the RiseUp Network.
It is a real problem for the network: do users can trust people
they do not know? Where do these people come from? What
is their background?
III. PROJECT PARTICIPANTS AND INTERNAL
ORGANIZATION
During our study, we have gathered different files con-
taining a list of people who have participated in the TOR
Project. Our purpose is to explain, in a simple way, the
organization inside the TOR Project Inc. (Name of the
company). If the TOR Project is really transparent in this
internal organization, we should be able to have a list
of all participants. This list is available in the Core Peo-
ple page (https://www.torproject.org/about/
corepeople.html.en). Furthermore, a few personal
repositories were opened and we have downloaded the data
in order to learn more about this firm. We will present our
study results about those people, their role and expose a few
hidden people.
A. Core People
We have collected information about every person who is
present in the official website of TOR from the beginning
of 2017. The website has changed since and we have seen
that a few people have disappeared and other have appeared.
We have divided those people in seven groups: Founders,
Researcher, Developer, Advocate, Administrative ant Tech
leader, Technical Support and Others (see Figure 2). In this
web page, we have information regarding the role of each
people in the TOR Project.
First, we focus on the career path of the three founders.
The founders are the developers of the first version of the
TOR protocol. Nick Mathewson is a former MIT student as
Roger Dingledine was. With the first directory authorities
Moria1, Moria2 and Moria3 hosted in the MIT, we can say
Fig. 2. Core People
that the MIT is the location where the first implementation
of the onion routing was set up (the very first version of
the TOR network). The third person is Paul Syverson which
is a US military from the US Naval Researcher Laboratory.
He and his team (in the US NRL) have designed the onion
routing protocol (Goldschlag et al., 1996; Syverson et al.,
1997). The TOR project is only the visible part of a larger
US project.
After having created the TOR network, Paul Syverson has
continued to work with the TOR foundation. There are at
least 25 research papers coming from Paul Syverson for the
TOR network. The last example in date was the 18th of
September 2017 for the version tor-0.3.2.1 which was imple-
mented by following a paper wrote by Paul Syverson and his
team from the US NRL only. Furthermore, Roger Dingledine
spent a summer in internship in the NSA, so we can suppose
that he has kept a few contacts in there. Officially, TOR is not
developed anymore by the US government but a major part
of changes was designed and developed by Paul Syverson
through the US NRL and some people have work closely
for the US government (not only among founders).
With the change of the Core People page, a few people
have disappeared. A lot of them were simply developers (6
in total), two were from the technical support and one was
a researcher. The interesting person who has disappeared
is Jérémy Bobbio, better known as Lunar. His repository
was huge and thanks to him, we have discovered all the
presentations done about the TOR project. In this conference,
we found a number of presentations to the highest authorities
of the United States. Two presentations of the project were
made in the FBI on 2009 and 2012, one in the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service (NCIS) which is the investigation unit
affiliated to the US Navy (as the US NRL) in 2012 and one
in the White House in 2013.
Two other people have disappeared: Micah Anderson and
Peter Palfrader. Those two people were (or are) owner of a
directory authority. Peter Palfrader was the owner of tor26
(the first directory authority which does not belong to Roger
Dingledine). Released in the version tor-0.0.8.1 in October
2004, the directory authority is not working anymore. It
is more important for Micah Anderson because we do not
longer have information on the website. Previously, on the
old version of the Core People page, we have his nickname
and a little description explaining that he ran one of the
directory authorities. If a few people need to be on the Core
People page, it will be the founder of the TOR Foundation
and the people running a directory authority. With this
disappearance, the customers have less information about the
people who actually handle the network.
We note that the Core People page is not containing infor-
mation about a few important people in the TOR Foundation.
This page is not sufficient to have an idea of who are the
true leaders of the foundation. We have explained who are the
leaders of the network (directory authorities) but not those
of the foundation.
B. Employees
To get a list of all employees and leaders (administratively
speaking), we have used the form 990. This form is originally
for the accounting section (cf 4.1 Form 990 – Global
Revenue 2015) but there is a list of all paid employees. This
form is not released for the year 2016 or 2017 so we have
study the document from 2015.
In the part VII, we have the list of directors, key em-
ployees. . . We discover a few names that are not on the
Core People page. Rob Thomas, Meredith Dunn, Andrew
Lewman, Mike Perry and Andrea Shepard are still unknown.
They represent five over eleven people ( 45%) that are key
people for the foundation. Some contractors were hired, Pearl
Crescent for example (a developer), and were “hidden” by
the foundation. The TOR foundation asks indirectly a blind
trust on the source code (due to the huge amount of line) and
they give the development to people we do not even know.
Due to the scandal with Jacob Appelbaum (Greenberg,
2016), the board of directors has completely changed. Every
director, including Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathweson
has left to let the place to six new board members. Among
them we find Matt Blaze, Cindy Cohn, Gabriella Coleman,
Linus Nordberg, Megan Price and Bruce Schneier. In this list,
Megan Price and Bruce Schneier are not present on the Core
People page. To draw a hierarchical graph of the foundation,
we need to wait the form 990 for the year 2016 (which is still
not available). It is a big change for the foundation. As we
said, we have worked on the previous Core People page and
the form 990 from 2015 and no one (except Linus Nordberg)
was known.
No relevant information is available on the webpage, so
we have looked for others information in different other
places and with different other sources. Matt Blaze is an
Associate Professor of Computer and Information Science in
the University of Pennsylvania. He has no previous link with
the TOR Foundation. Cindy Cohn is a Lawyer specialized
in Internet laws. She is the current Executive Director of
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). She worked on
the case Hepting v. At&T which is a case where AT&T
was accused to help the NSA to collect data. The case
was dismissed on June 2009. She has no previous link with
the TOR foundation. Gabriella Coleman is an anthropologist
who studies hacking and online activism. She is in the board
of several organizations to defend the women rights and
private life. As the two-previous people, she does not seem to
have previous history with the TOR foundation. Megan Price
is the Executive Director of the Human Rights Data Analysis
Group (HRDAG). She has no link with the TOR foundation
before joining the board. Bruce Schneier is an American
cryptologist. Before creating his company (Counterpane), he
has worked with the Department of Defense (DoJ). He has
no previous link to the TOR foundation. Linus Goldberg is
the only board member who has worked on the TOR network
before.
IV. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
The TOR Foundation is regularly claiming that the US
government is not funding anymore the TOR Project (Din-
gledine, 2017). To confirm or not this affirmation, we have
analyzed two different documents which are present on the
TOR Project website. The first is the form 990 that we
used for gathering the list of employees. The second is the
“Consolidated Financial Statements and Reports required for
Audits in Accordance with Government Auditing Standards
and Uniform Guidance”.
The purpose of this study is to understand the position
of the US government regarding the TOR network and if
whether it is involved in the different funds or not. The
position of the US government for the TOR network is
odd, strange and weird. In one hand, the US government
has authorized the US NRL to publish papers for the onion
routing protocol. In the other hand, different organizations
like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) are trying to crack the TOR net-
work. The National Security Agency (NSA) is often involved
in rumors which denounced spying or cracking the TOR
network.
We have proceeded by studying the last financial report
at our disposal. The financial statements for 2016 or 2017
are still not released to the date of the present paper so the
financial report of 2015 was our only option. At the end of
this study, an evolution of the funding of the TOR project
will be made.
A. Form 990 - Global revenue - 2015
First, we study the global revenue of the TOR foundation
for the year 2015. For this, there are four categories: Con-
tributions and grants, Program service revenue, Investment
income, other revenue. The following graph is the repartition
of all incomes.
As we can see in Figure 3, most of the funds are coming
from the category “Program Service”. The other major part
is from the “Contribution and grants category”. In this
category, there is no obligation to publish the donators and
the amount of donation for each. To be more precise on our
study, we tried to get more information about the Program
service revenue.
Fig. 3. Repartition of Funds
B. Program revenue - 2015
The aim of this study is to determine whether the rumors
according to which the US government would help a lot the
TOR foundation from a financial point of view, is true or not.
For that purpose, we have gathered information from the two
above-mentioned sources. In Table 2, we have detailed the
entire program and computed the funding proportion of each
program.
2015 - $ Details 2015 - %
Program service 2,808,143. 2,808,143.
– 100%
85,65%
RFA Con-
tract
886,724. –
31,58%
DoS Direct
(DRL
grant)
857,515. –
30,54%
DoD SRI Lights
Contract
719,500. –
25,62%
US Inde-
pendent
Agency
Direct
(NSF)
225,184. –
8,02%
DoS Internet
Networks
104,540. –
3,72%
Unknown 13,500. –
0,48%
US Inde-
pendent
Agency
NSF
(through
RUM)
1,180. –
0,04%
Contrib & Grants 460,298. 14,04%
Other revenue 7,918 0,24%
Investment income 2,093 0,06%
Total 3,278,452 100%
TABLE II
FUNDING DETAILS FOR THE YEAR 2015
In Table 2, incomes from (directly or not) the US govern-
ment are underlined in grey. As we can see, at least 58.20%
of the total funds are coming from different departments of
the US government. The status of RFA (Radio Free Asia)
Contract is unclear and there are persistent allegations and
testimonies (Prados, 2017; Levine, 2015) or even suggestions
that it could be strongly connected to the CIA more than
expected (Levine, 2015). Would this suspicion be true, the
rate of funds from US government-related entities would
grow up to 85.24%. With these two-huge ratios, we can say
that the US government is very active from the financial point
of view (let us note that a few incomes are still unknown
because the TOR project does not need to release the list of
ALL donators).
C. Funds from the US government since 2007
The accountings are available since the TOR foundation
gets the status of non-profit organization. With all data
gathered during our study, we were able to study the financial
report of each year and to determine which funds are from
the US government directly or indirectly (Figure 4).
Fig. 4. US funding since 2007
As explained previously, we are not sure that some in-
comes are from the US government. To avoid uncertainties,
in this graph, we give the minimal value of the US govern-
ment implication regarding the revenue. By studying all the
annual financial reports, we see that since 2011, the list of
programs is almost the same (NSF, SRI, Internews and DRL).
The other interesting thing is the progression of the total
revenue per year. For example, between 2007 and 2008, only
80,000$ were added to the annual incomes however, between
2011 and 2012, the revenue just doubled. To illustrate the
progression, Table 2 summarizes the changes year per year.
Years 2009 and 2012 are interesting: the global revenue
almost doubled in one year. Each time, it is the “Program
revenue” category which was multiplied by 2. No event is
simply identifiable which would justify such an increase of
the revenue.
Percentage increase
2007 ⇒ 2008 17.313 %
2008 ⇒ 2009 96.126 %
2009 ⇒ 2010 28.290 %
2010 ⇒ 2011 3.797 %
2011 ⇒ 2012 88.088 %
2012 ⇒ 2013 10.121 %
2013 ⇒ 2014 -11.018 %
2014 ⇒ 2015 28.246 %
TABLE III
AUGMENTATION OF REVENUE SINCE 2007
V. TECHNICAL ASPECTS
We will not develop most of the technical aspects that
could suggest or confirm that somehow the TOR network
has been designed or is managed in such a way that a few
“facilities” are possible and would enable to take control
over it. In (Filiol and al., 2017 & 2018) it has been proved
that the TOR routing protocol suffers from rather severe
flaws. As a consequence, taking the control of a reduced
number of TOR relays (from 450 to 1400 only) would
enable to reduce the TOR traffic of at least 50 % and would
greatly ease correlation attacks (about 35 % of the traffic) or
eavesdropping (about 10 % of the traffic).
As far as the relay bridges management is concerned, it has
been possible to extract slightly more than 2,500 such bridges
thus compromising the alleged ability to bypass censorship.
Following the disclosure of our results (Filiol and al., 2017)
we got a very interesting feedback and case that strongly
confirms that security management in the Tor network is not
sufficient and thus intelligence entities could easily do really
undercover things.
During our study, in September 2017, we were contacted
by a user of a custom TOR library. This library is the “node-
Tor” written in JavaScript and allows the user to create
and run a node or connect to the TOR network. Further
exchanges with this person have shown a lot of inconsistency
and irregularities.
At first, we talk about the way that his node was added
to the network. For this custom library, the user asked the
TOR foundation to add a node with this library and after
an exchange of a few mails the node was accepted and run.
The library is very different from the original source code.
To compare very simply those two codes, we just compared
the number of code lines. We know that the number of code
lines does not really reflect the effect of the code but between
the original source code (several hundreds of thousands code
lines) and the library (only fifteen hundred code lines), we
can assure that it is very likely that a number of options or
securities are missing.
It is not the designer of this code who is responsible
but rather the TOR foundation for accepting a node on the
network with this kind of library. The first problem is that
no one is warned that this node is special and is not running
the official source code. This node owned by a user is not
controlled by the TOR foundation. So if the user is malicious,
he could modify his node and make every change he wants.
If a government wants to include this kind of node to log the
traffic and gather it, he can do it very simply and without
triggering any alert.
For now, his node is running in two ports: one on the
port 8001 for the classical connection and on the port 8002
for a websocket port. To use the TOR network, every client
needs to create a circuit of three nodes. The circuit is created
according to the following process:
• Pick randomly three nodes (in the case of external
circuits)
• Send “Create Path” to the guard node
• Send “Extend Path” to the guard
• Send “Extend Path” to the middle
In the case where a custom node-TOR is used as guard or
middle node, it will not be able to extend the circuit. But,
if the node is used as an exit node, the node can be used
because it will not receive an “Extend Path” frame. When
we talked to the owner of this node, he ensured us that the
node is not able to extend and that node was here only for
research purposes but in reality, this node can be used as an
exit node.
By checking his log, he noticed that circuits were created
whenever using the TOR Browser. One of the circuits was
his own node-TOR on port 8002 for the entry node, a random
TOR node for the middle node and his node-TOR on port
8001. Here, we have a serious problem regarding the family
policy established in the TOR protocol (in the torrc file
precisely). After checking the node-TOR library, we were
not able to find the management of the family. This proves
that the TOR foundation is accepting every library which
looks like the original source code. Among the users of the
TOR network, a few of them only have really read the source.
As they do not read the source code, they have a blind trust
of this network and the TOR foundation accepts any custom
library. If the security of the network is ensured by the fact
that all the nodes run the same source code, with the same
security level, the same options and so on. . . this fact proves
that the TOR network is not so secure.
Then, we discussed about how the node was accepted on
the network. For running his node with the library, he was
asked to register his node on several directory authorities
(Gabelmoo, Dizum, Tonga, Tor26, Dannenberg, Maatuska,
Urras, Turlte and Moria1). Tonga is the ancestor of Bifroest,
the bridge authority. Without knowing it, his node was
not registered on the “classical” consensus file but in the
consensus for the bridge. Against his will, his node was
considered as a bridge during all the time and he was not
even aware of this. He became aware just when we released
the list of 2,500 bridges.
Today, the logs are different: almost all directory au-
thorities do not register this custom node anymore, except
one: Urras. Urras is no longer a directory authority since
2015. This node belongs to Jacob Applebaum. It means that
apparently, he continues his role at least with this custom
node. However Jacob Applebaum has been fired from the
TOR foundation and is no longer supposed to keep this
particular role.
This feedback from this user was really interesting. We
have discovered that with only few exchanges with the TOR
foundation, we can add a custom node (possibly malicious).
As for every node, no systematic control is possible by the
TOR foundation, once accepted within in the network, we
can do what we want with this node, log the traffic, insert
biases in the creation of circuits etc. . . In summary, we think
that the TOR project should not accept custom codes in
order to respect the uniformity of the network that ensures
“security”.
VI. CONCLUSION
To conclude this presentation of our study, let us make
a summary of all information that we have gathered and
conclusions we have drawn. First, the critical point of the
TOR network: the directory authorities. As we saw, some of
them are handled by “unknown” people. In the real world, we
teach children not to speak with unknown people but here,
it seems not disturbing for most of the TOR users to trust
perfect strangers. As far as confidence is concerned, nobody
(except state organization) has the courage/time to read the
source code and no one is paying attention to the designer of
the changes on the TOR source code. Paul Syverson (from
the US NRL) is the original designer (not developer) of most
of implementation. The last version of TOR is the perfect
example: all major changes are coming from the US NRL.
The US government is not just present on the source code:
he is also present on the funding of the TOR project. Some
years, more than 80% was given by the US government
through various Departments (State and Defense mostly).
No official statement revels that the US government is
helping the TOR network but all the information gathered
during our study seems to confirm that the US government
is still deeply involved in the TOR project. The privacy online
and the anonymity are more and more present in every debate
about Internet. The TOR project has recently announced that
they provide those characteristics (Dingledine, 2017) and
many peoples rely on this and trust them. For journalists
in a country where the censorship is very present, for
political activist the TOR network is the only solution to hide
themselves and protect their real identity. For the militaries
that use TOR to communicate in a secure way, if a country,
an organization has the control of the channel or a way to
spy the communication, it would be a disaster.
This study is not claiming breaking the TOR network
or affirms that the US government is the real organization
behind the TOR project. However favoring such a network
would be a clear violation of the Wassenaar Agreement
(www.wassenaar.org) unless some sort of control is
in place in a way or another (Filiol, 2013). This study
aims at informing TOR users and to make them aware
of network like the TOR network and the possible reality
behind. Customers need to be informed before using any
network who claims to protect your privacy and anonymity.
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